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Abstract
Because the data show that market tightness is not orthogonal
to unemployment, this paper identifies the many empirical difficul-
ties caused by adopting the free entry of vacancies assumption in
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework. Relaxing the free en-
try assumption and using SMM finds the vacancy creation process is
less than infinitely elastic. Because a recession-leading job separation
shock then causes vacancies to fall as unemployment increases, the ad
hoc restriction to zero job separation shocks (to generate Beveridge
curve dynamics) becomes redundant. In contrast to standard argu-
ments, the calibrated model finds the job separation process drives
unemployment volatility over the cycle.
This paper shows how the unemployment dynamics implied by the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides framework change fundamentally when the free entry
of vacancies assumptions is relaxed. This is important because we show a
key implication of the free entry approach - that conditional on productivity
variables, market tightness is orthogonal to unemployment - is not consis-
tent with the data. Furthermore with a less than infinitely elastic vacancy
creation process, we show why a recession-leading job separation shock then
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causes vacancies to fall as unemployment increases. This dynamic response
is important because an ad hoc restriction to zero job separation shocks is
not then necessary to generate Beveridge curve correlations. And once an
exogenous, but data-relevant, job separation process is allowed, the relaxed
framework further finds it is no longer necessary to make a small surplus
assumption to generate sufficient unemployment volatility; e.g. Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016). Several tests identify
the much improved empirical properties of this relaxed approach relative to
the free entry approach. And somewhat surprisingly, even though the cali-
brated model’s reduced form properties are fully consistent with the Shimer
(2012) decomposition of the ins-and-outs of unemployment (which seemingly
suggest job separation shocks play only a minor role in explaining unemploy-
ment volatility), the structural model finds it is the job separation process
which drives the large variation in unemployment over the cycle.
The seminal contribution of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) [MP from
now on] was to identify an equilibrium model of unemployment consistent
with 3 claimed properties of the business cycle; (MP1) job destruction flows
and job creation flows covary negatively, (MP2) job destruction flows have
greater variance than job creation flows, and (MP3) job destruction patterns
are asymmetric in that job destruction increases rapidly at the start of reces-
sion (also see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), the recent survey by Elsby et al
(2015) and Figures 4 and 5 below regarding the Great Recession).1 Shimer
(2005), of course, identifies three difficulties with the MP framework: (S1)
it generates too little unemployment persistence, (S2) with an appropriately
calibrated productivity process, it yields insufficient unemployment volatility
and (S3) large job separation shocks generate a counterfactual positive corre-
lation between unemployment and vacancies. Following Shimer (2005), Hall
(2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the equilibrium unemployment
literature typically assumes no aggregate job separation shocks and small
surplus. Although this approach speaks to the Shimer criticisms (S1)-(S3),
it is inconsistent with (MP1)-(MP3) for it implies a much larger variance of
job creation flows than of job separation flows. An important aim of our
paper is to identify a fully consistent approach.
1Because we abstract from on-the-job search, our paper follows Shimer (2005) and
refers instead to job separation shocks which describe the outflow of employed workers
into unemployment. Job destruction shocks are clearly related but are not the same for,
with on-the-job search, a job is also destroyed when an employee quits for alternative work
and the firm does not hire a replacement.
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The free entry of vacancies assumption is very strong for it implies a
penny increase in productivity causes an instantaneous jump in the number
of vacancies.2 Instead we adopt a job creation process analogous to Diamond
(1982) and Fujita and Ramey (2005): creating a new job here requires an
initial investment in a new technology, where the sunk cost of any such in-
vestment is considered a random draw from an exogenous distribution. This
“Diamond entry” process encompasses the free entry assumption as a special
case but, with a finite measure of firms and heterogeneous investment costs,
it also allows a vacancy creation process which is less than infinitely elastic.
Because this elasticity is central to explaining equilibrium unemployment
dynamics, we use Simulated Method of Moments to identify it using target
moments taken from Shimer (2005) which describe the cyclical behavior of
unemployment, vacancies and market tightness. Rather than being infinitely
elastic, SMM instead finds the vacancy creation process is inelastic. This has
important consequences. For example unlike the free entry case, a steep in-
crease in unemployment does not generate a correspondingly steep increase in
vacancies. Indeed an inelastic vacancy creation process generates the added
unemployment persistence which is otherwise missing in the free entry ap-
proach; a more muted vacancy creation response to higher unemployment
implies lower job finding rates and thus more persistent unemployment. It
also fundamentally changes the impulse response of the economy to a job
separation shock.
With free entry, large job separation shocks generate a counter-factual
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies; e.g. Shimer (2005).
This is not the case with Diamond entry. Following a single job separation
shock, the calibrated model finds the stock of vacancies falls because over-
sampling by the pulse of laid-off workers depletes the existing vacancy stock.
An inelastic vacancy creation process and a positively autocorrelated job sep-
aration process then generate an increasing unemployment stock, a declining
vacancy stock which together imply worker job finding rates plummet. We
show these unemployment dynamics, following a recessionary job separation
shock, are fully consistent with the insights of Shimer (2005), (2012). But
equally importantly, the approach is also consistent with (MP1)-(MP3) and
the U.S. unemployment dynamics which followed the Great Recession.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
2Free entry implies vacancies exhibit high frequency variations which is also inconsistent
with the data; e.g. Sniekers (2016).
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section 3 characterises its (Markov) equilibrium. Section 4 describes the
calibration exercise and considers various tests which compare the model’s
properties to the properties of the free entry/small surplus/no job separa-
tion shocks approach (also see Elsby et al (2015) for a different test which
supports our approach). Section 5 examines the role played by the job sepa-
ration process in explaining unemployment volatility and section 6 uses the
calibrated model to consider the impact of the Great Recession on US labour
market outcomes but using layoffs [taken from JOLTS] as the measure of job
separation shocks. Section 7 concludes and section 8 contains the Data Ap-
pendix.
1 Model
We use a conventional equilibrium unemployment framework with discrete
time and an infinite time horizon; e.g. Pissarides (2000). All firms and
all workers are equally productive, all firms pay the same (Nash bargained)
wage, each worker-firm match survives until it is hit by a job separation
shock. The only difference is that vacancies evolve as a stock variable with
a less than infinitely elastic vacancy creation process. Without free entry
the stocks of unemployment and vacancies become relevant aggregate state
variables.
There is a finite, fixed measure F > 0 of firms who create vacancies. In
every period, each firm has one new (independent) “business opportunity”.
Given that opportunity, the firm compares its investment cost x against its
expected return. Its expected return depends on the state of the aggregate
economy at time t, denoted Ωt which is described in detail below. We let
Jt = J(Ωt) denote the expected return of a business opportunity in state Ωt.
The investment cost x is an idiosyncratic random draw from an exogenous
cost distribution H. For tractability we assume this investment cost captures
all of the idiosyncratic features associated with any given business venture
- in other words, highly profitable opportunities correspond to low realised
values of x. Should the firm decide to invest, it pays the sunk cost x and
then holds an unfilled job with expected value Jt; i.e. each new investment
generates one new vacancy.
Following Diamond (1982), each firm invests in its business opportunity
if and only if it has positive value; i.e. when x ≤ Jt. This requires no recall
of a business opportunity should the firm not immediately invest in it. As
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investment occurs whenever x ≤ Jt then, at the aggregate level, it = FH(Jt)
describes total period t new vacancy creation.
To describe how a firm fills a vacancy, we adopt the standard matching
framework (but without free entry). There is a unit measure of infinitely lived
workers. All workers and firms are risk neutral and have the same discount
factor 0 < β < 1. Workers switch between being employed and unemployed
depending on their realised labour market outcomes. c ≥ 0 describes the per
period cost of posting an unfilled vacancy.
Each period is characterised by the measure vt of vacancies (currently
unfilled jobs) and the measure ut of unemployed workers (so that 1 − ut
describes the number employed). The hiring process is frictional: the measure
mt of new job-worker matches in period t is described by a matching function
mt = m(ut, vt), where m(.) is positive, increasing, concave and homogenous
of degree one.
While unemployed a job seeker enjoys per period payoff z > 0. In period
t, each job-worker match produces the same market output p = pt, where
aggregate productivity pt evolves according to an exogenous AR1 process
(described below). Job separations are also an exogenous, stochastic process
where δt describes the probability that any given job, either filled or unfilled,
is destroyed. In the event of a filled job being destroyed, the worker separates
from the firm and becomes unemployed, while the job’s continuation payoff
is zero.
We next describe the sequence of events within each period t. Each period
has 5 stages:
Stage I [new realisations]: given (pt−1, δt−1) from the previous period,
new values of pt, δt are realised according to
ln pt = ρp ln pt−1 + εt
ln δt = ρδ ln δt−1 + (1− ρδ) ln δ + ηt
where (εt, ηt) are white noise innovations drawn from the Normal distribution
with mean zero, covariance matrix Σ, δ > 0 is the long-run average job
separation rate while long-run productivity p is normalised to one;
Stage II [bargaining and production]: the wage wt is determined
by Nash bargaining. Production takes place so that a job match yields one
period profit pt − wt while the employed worker enjoys payoff wt. Each un-
employed worker enjoys payoff z;
Stage III [vacancy investment]: firms invest in new vacancies it;
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Stage IV [matching]: let ut,vt denote the stock of unemployed job
seekers and vacancies at the start of this stage. Matching takes place so that
mt = m(ut, vt) describes the total number of new matches;
Stage V [job separation]: each vacancy and each filled job is indepen-
dently destroyed with probability δt.
2 Markov Dynamics and Equilibrium.
This section describes the (Markov) equilibrium dynamics. Because ut is de-
fined as the number unemployed in period t immediately prior to the match-
ing stage (stage IV), then ut evolves according to:
ut = ut−1 + δt−1(1− ut−1)− (1− δt−1)mt−1 (1)
where mt−1 = m(ut−1, vt−1). The second term describes the stock of employed
workers in period t − 1 who become unemployed through a job separation
shock. The last term describes the match outflow where such matches are
also subject to the period t− 1 job separation shock.
The vacancy stock dynamics are given by
vt = (1− δt−1)[vt−1 −mt−1] + it, (2)
where the first term describes those vacancies which survive (unfilled) from
the previous matching event, while it describes new vacancy creation.
To determine equilibrium new vacancy creation it we restrict attention to
Markov equilibria. Once (pt, δt) are realised, define the intermediate stock of
vacancies
v˜t = (1− δt−1)[vt−1 −mt−1]
which is the number of surviving vacancies carried over from the previous
matching event. When bargaining occurs in stage II, let Ωt = {pt, δt, ut, v˜t}
denote the corresponding state space. As described below, any standard
Nash bargaining procedure yields a wage rule of the form wt = w
N(Ωt).
Stage III then determines optimal investment it = i(Ωt). As the matching
and separation dynamics ensure Ωt evolves as a first order Markov process,
then Ωt is indeed a sufficient statistic for optimal decision making in period
t.
6
We next characterise the Bellman equations describing optimal behaviour.
In period t and at the start of stage II with state vector Ωt (i.e. prior to
production and matching but after new pt, δt have been realised) let:
Jt = J(Ωt) denote the expected value of a vacancy;
JFt = J
F (Ωt) denote the expected value of a filled job;
V Ut = V
U(Ωt) denote the worker’s expected value of unemployment;
V Et = V
E(Ωt) denote the worker’s expected value of employment.
Let E[.|Ωt] denote the expectations operator given period t state vector
Ωt. The timing of the model implies the value functions Jt, J
F
t are defined
recursively by:
Jt = −c+ β(1− δt)E
{
m(ut, vt)
vt
JFt+1 + [1−
m(ut, vt)
vt
]Jt+1|Ωt
}
(3)
JFt = pt − wt + β(1− δt)E{JFt+1|Ωt}. (4)
The worker value functions are also defined recursively:
V Ut = z + βE
[
V Ut+1 + (1− δt)
m(ut, vt)
ut
[
V Et+1 − V Ut+1
] |Ωt] (5)
V Et = wt + βE
[
V Et+1 + δt+1[V
U
t+1 − V Et+1]|Ωt
]
. (6)
Because firms invest if and only if the business opportunity has cost x ≤ Jt,
equilibrium new vacancy creation it = i(Ωt) where
it = FH(Jt), (7)
and Jt = J(Ωt).
Assuming workers have bargaining power φ ∈ [0, 1], the axiomatic Nash
bargaining approach closes the model with
(1− φ) [V Et − V Ut ] = φ [Jt − JVt ] .
Using the above equations, this condition determines the equilibrium wage
wt = w(Ωt). The above thus yields a system of autonomous, first order dif-
ference equations determining (i) the evolution of Ωt and (ii) the equilibrium
value functions with corresponding investment rule it = i(Ωt).
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3 Calibration and Tests.
The following calibrates the model to the data considered in Shimer (2005).
As the framework is so standard, we adopt the calibration parameters as de-
scribed in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). Specifically we assume each period
corresponds to one month and a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function
m = Auγv1−γ. Table 1 describes the corresponding Mortensen/Nagypal pa-
rameter values.
Table 1: Mortensen/Nagypal Parameters
Parameter Value
γ elasticity parameter on matching function 0.6
φ worker bargaining power 0.6
z outside value of leisure 0.7
β monthly discount factor 0.9967
Note the Hosios condition is satisfied. As the productivity process for pt
implies its (long run) mean value equals one, surplus (1 − z)/z = 43% is
large. The monthly discount factor implies an annual discount rate of 4%.
Rather than impose zero job separation shocks, we calibrate the {pt, δt}
process to the data described in Shimer (2005). Figure 1 describes the mag-
nitude of log-deviations in (i) job separation rates and (ii) labor productivity
as computed for the Shimer (2005) data at business cycle frequencies.3
As these data are only recorded quarterly while the model adopts a
monthly time structure, we choose the autocorrelation parameters ρp, ρδ
and covariance matrix Σ so that the implied process (pt, δt), when reported
at quarterly intervals, matches the first order autocorrelation and cross cor-
relation implied by the data. Doing this yields:
As demonstrated in Figure 1 and consistent with the view expressed in
MP, the job separation innovations are strongly negatively correlated with
productivity innovations and have much greater variance. Of course MP de-
scribed an endogenous job destruction margin and a single exogenous stochas-
tic process for {pt}.
When calibrating a DMP framework, it is often found the vacancy post-
ing cost c must be large. This is typically explained by arguing it reflects
3The Data Appendix describes how Shimer (2005) measures the job separation rate.
4Both series are in logs as deviations from a HP trend with smoothing parameter 105
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Figure 1: U.S. Separation Rates and Labor Productivity [1951-2003]4
Table 2: (pt, δt) Stochastic Process [Monthly Frequencies]
Parameter Value
ρp productivity autocorrelation 0.965
ρδ separation autocorrelation 0.875
σp st. dev. productivity shocks 0.0070
σδ st. dev. separation shocks 0.042
ρpδ cross correlation -0.63
previously sunk job creation investments. Here we take the converse case:
we instead presume small vacancy posting costs (c = 0) and so all job cre-
ation costs are tied to the ex-ante investment decision. Given the vacancy
creation rule implies it = FH(Jt), we adopt the simplest, most parsimonious
functional form
it = FJ
ξ
t (8)
so that ξ describes the elasticity of new vacancy creation with respect to
vacancy value. ξ =∞ describes infinitely elastic new vacancy creation (anal-
ogous to the free entry case) while ξ = 0 implies perfectly inelastic (fixed)
new vacancy creation.
The framework is calibrated to fit the long run turnover means. To ensure
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comparability of results, we follow Shimer (2005) who argues that (i) the
mean job separation probability should equal 3.4% per month, (ii) the average
duration of an unemployment spell is 2.2 months and thus the long run
unemployment rate equals u = 7%. We also note the average duration of
vacancies is around 3 weeks (Blanchard and Diamond (1989)). The first
restriction ties down δ = 0.034 [mean monthly job separation]. Depending
on the choice of ξ, the latter two restrictions tie down A [the scale parameter
on the matching function] and F [the scale parameter on the vacancy creation
rule]. For example the choice ξ = 1 [the distribution of investment costs is
uniform] requires A = 0.594 and F = 0.0075.
This leaves us with one free parameter ξ, the elasticity of the job creation
process. We estimate ξ using simulated method of moments as described in
Ruge-Murcia (2012) with a Newey-West diagonal weighting matrix. For each
chosen value ξ we first update parameter values (A,F ) so the generated data
is consistent with the long run turnover means. The target moments used
to identify ξ are the standard deviations and correlations of unemployment,
vacancies and market tightness taken from Table 1 in Shimer (2005).
3.1 Results
Column 1 [labelled Data] in Table 3 records the data targets, where the
Beveridge curve (BC) describes the negative correlation of vacancies with
unemployment. The remaining columns describe the corresponding statistics
using model generated data.
We begin with the final column, labelled H/M. This column instead as-
sumes free entry, sets z = 0.955 (small surplus), φ = 0.052 (low worker
bargaining power), δt = δ (no separation shocks) as considered in Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008).5 This specification yields the Beveridge curve [BC]
and good volatility outcomes. The column “H/M with JD” augments the
H/M specification with the above job separation process (and c appropri-
ately recalibrated). Adding separation shocks yields greater unemployment
volatility but, consistent with the arguments in Shimer (2005), reduces the
strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies.6
5For comparability of results we otherwise retain the Mortensen/Nagypal parameter
values, set x = 0 and calibrate c to fit the same long run turnover means. Doing this
implies c = 0.63. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) instead specify γ = 0.41, δ = 0.026,
c = 0.58.
6Fujita and Ramey (2012) also make this point and consider the role of on-the-job
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Table 3: Simulation Results
Data ξ = 0.265 ξ = 1 H/M with JD H/M
Standard Deviations
σu 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.14
σv 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.27
σθ 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.40 0.40
Cross Correlations
corr(v,u) [BC] -0.89 -0.96 -0.93 -0.76 -0.87
corr(θ, u) -0.97 -0.99 -0.99 -0.92 -0.95
corr(θ, v) 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.99
Notes: σx is the standard deviation of x, and corr(x, y), the cross correlation be-
tween x and y. Column 2 contains the quarterly moments from Shimer(2005)’s
table 1. Column 3 are the statistics from the estimated model. Column 4,
simulated model with ξ = 1, column 5, free entry model with H/M calibration
with separation shocks, and the last column, H/M calibration without separa-
tion shocks. To calculate the quarterly moments, models are first simulated at
monthly frequency, and then aggregated.
The ξ = 1 column describes the results when the vacancy creation pro-
cess is assumed unit elastic. For that choice, the model generates the right
correlated behaviour but there is too little volatility. To fit the volatility tar-
gets, SMM infers the vacancy creation process must be less than unit elastic,
where estimated ξ = 0.265. Although ξ = 0.265 slightly overstates the nega-
tive correlation of unemployment and vacancies, the fit to the chosen targets
is otherwise perfect.
We now consider 3 tests which identify the very different dynamic prop-
erties of our relaxed approach relative to the free entry case. Section 6 uses
those insights to consider the dynamics of unemployment following the Great
Recession. The Data Appendix reports the full set of data moments [cor-
responding to Table 1, Shimer (2005)] and the corresponding table for the
case ξ = 0.265. Importantly for what follows, note Table 1, Shimer (2005)
finds that market tightness has an exceptionally high raw correlation of -0.97
with unemployment (also see Table 3), while the raw correlation of market
tightness with productivity is only 0.40 and with job separation rates it is
search in mitigating this problem.
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-0.71.
3.2 Test 1: Market Tightness Dynamics
Market tightness θt = Vt/Ut determines how worker job finding rates vary
over the cycle. The free entry approach yields a particularly useful simpli-
fication: that equilibrium market tightness θt = θ
∗(pt, δt) is independent of
unemployment Ut. But conditional on (pt, δt), an obvious statistical test is
whether market tightness θt is indeed orthogonal to unemployment. We thus
ask whether the model generated market tightness dynamics are consistent
with the data.
Column 1 [Data] in Table 4 reports the results of estimating a reduced
form, log-linear statistical relationship
log θt = α0 + α1 log pt + α2 log δt + α3 logUt−1, (9)
on Shimer (2005) HP filtered data where, because market tightness is mea-
sured as Vt/Ut, we mitigate simultaneity issues by using last period Ut−1 as
the conditioning variable.7 Estimated t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Table 4: Reduced Form Market Tightness Dynamics
Parameters Data ξ = 0.265 ξ = 1 H/M with JD
α̂1 [productivity]
1.043
(1.98)
0.96
(80.0)
2.07
(188)
20.0
(2535)
α̂2 [JD δt]
-1.66
(-10.4)
-0.65
(-240)
-0.51
(196)
-0.26
(-180)
α̂3 [unemployment]
-1.43
(-26.0)
-1.94
(-1620)
-1.56
(-1114)
-0.001
(-1.4)
Notes: Estimation results of reduced form equation (9), using Shimer
(2005) data (column 2) and models generated data (columns 3-5). t-
statistics are reported in brackets.
7using log Ut as the conditioning variable finds estimated productivity effects (α̂1) be-
come negative and insignificant, and there is an even stronger negative correlation between
unemployment and measured market tightness.
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According to the data (column 1), market tightness is positively corre-
lated with productivity and negatively correlated with job separation rates.
But productivity shocks are barely significant [a t-statistic equal to 1.98]
while market tightness is very strongly (negatively) correlated with unem-
ployment [a t-statistic equal to -26]. Figure 5 in Section 6, which graphs
how market tightness evolved following the 2008 Great Recession, fully sup-
ports this view of the data. The final column [H/M with JD] reports the
corresponding results for the free entry/small surplus approach, augmented
with the above job separation process. This approach yields the opposite sce-
nario: small surplus and free entry imply market tightness is almost entirely
driven by productivity shocks and, conditional on (pt, δt), market tightness
is orthogonal to unemployment.
Although not a perfect match, ξ = 0.265 yields parameter estimates which
are broadly consistent with those identified on the data: market tightness is
most highly [negatively] correlated with unemployment, though productivity
and job separation shocks also play significant roles. Surprisingly given the
insights that follow, the data suggest job separation shocks have an even
greater impact on market tightness than that implied by the model.
3.3 Test 2: Serial Persistence.
An important criticism due to Shimer (2005) is that the MP framework does
not generate sufficient persistence. Column 1 [Data] in Table 5 describes
the serial autocorrelation of unemployment, vacancies and market tightness
according to the (HP filtered) data. The remaining columns describe the
corresponding parameter estimates based on model generated data.
Measured at quarterly frequencies, the implied serial persistence param-
eters for productivity and job separation rates are ρp = 0.88, ρδ = 0.73
respectively. Column 1 [Data] in Table 5 reveals that unemployment, vacan-
cies and market tightness are much more persistent processes.
H/M with JD does not generate any added unemployment persistence
beyond that of the underlying productivity process. The reason is very sim-
ple: a free entry specification implies θ = θ∗(pt, δt) and, with no feedback
from unemployment to market tightness, the small surplus assumption then
implies unemployment has persistence ρu = ρp = 0.88 which is too low.
With ξ = 0.265, Column 2 demonstrates the serial persistence of (Ut, Vt, θt)
is a near-perfect match to that implied by the data. This occurs because, as
demonstrated in Table 4, market tightness is strongly, negatively correlated
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Table 5: Estimated Serial Persistence [Quarterly Frequencies]
Data ξ = 0.265 ξ = 1 H/M with JD.
unemployment 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.88
vacancies 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.76
market tightness 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.87
Notes: The data column is the autocorrelation of unemployment, vacan-
cies, and market tightness from Shimer(2005) table 1. The second column
contains the autocorrelations of these variables from the estimated model
(not targeted in estimation) and the rest are for the simulated model with
ξ = 1 and H/M calibration with job destruction shock.
with unemployment. Thus periods of high unemployment are characterised
by below trend job finding rates which then increase the persistence of high
unemployment. Of course the equilibrium degree of persistence ρu is an en-
dogenous outcome which depends on the propagation mechanism implied by
the model. Before examining that propagation mechanism in Section 5, we
report our third test.
3.4 Test 3: The Ins and Outs of Unemployment.
Shimer (2012) argues that the variation in unemployment is more highly
correlated with variations in worker job finding rates than with job separation
rates. The argument begins by noting that steady state unemployment
u =
x
x+ f
where x is the (steady state) exit rate of employed workers into unemploy-
ment and f the rate unemployed workers become employed. It is then argued
that the unemployment proxy
uPt =
xt
xt + ft
,
where xt is the period t exit rate and ft the job finding rate, is a reasonable
approximation for actual unemployment ut. This proxy variable u
P
t can then
be further decomposed into job separation effects (variations in xt) and job
finding effects (variations in ft). For example putting xt = x, the sequence
14
x/(x+ft) describes the variation in u
P
t due solely to variations in ft. Similarly
xt/(xt+f) describes the variation in u
P
t due to variations in xt. Shimer (2012)
defines the contribution of the job finding rate to variations in unemployment
as the covariance of ut and x/(x+ ft) divided by the variance of ut. Column
1, Table 1 in Shimer (2012) reports that variations in the job finding rate ft
contribute 77% of the variation in unemployment, while variations in the job
separation rate xt only contribute 24%.
8
The small surplus/free entry approach is broadly consistent with this de-
composition because large variations in job creation flows cause correspond-
ingly large variations in unemployment and worker job finding rates. We
now repeat the Shimer (2012) methodology on model-generated data with
ξ = 0.265.9 Computing those same statistics finds job finding variations,
x/(x + ft) contribute 77% of the unemployment variation, while job sep-
aration variations xt/(xt + f) contribute a slightly smaller 21%. The (re-
duced form) properties of the simulated data are thus fully consistent with
the Shimer (2012) decomposition. Nevertheless we now show unemployment
volatility in the structural model is driven by job separation shocks.
4 How Important are Job Separation Shocks
in Explaining Unemployment Variation?
The above has established our framework not only provides an excellent fit
for the volatilities, cross-correlations and persistences of market tightness,
unemployment and vacancies, it is also entirely consistent with the Shimer
(2012) decomposition of the ins and outs of unemployment. The interesting
question then is how important are job separation shocks in explaining un-
employment volatility? To answer this question we can instead assume zero
job separation shocks δt = δ, recalibrate the productivity process appropri-
ately and re-estimate ξ. Doing this yields unemployment volatility σu = 0.05
which is only a quarter of that observed in the data.10 This should not be
surprising because Figure 1 demonstrates that productivity shocks are small
and we have not specified small surplus. But how can this DMP frame-
8see Figures 4 and 6 in Elsby et al (2009) and Table 1 in Fujita and Ramey (2009) for
alternative estimates.
9with xt ≡ δt and ft ≡ (1− δt)m(θt).
10With no separation shocks SMM maximises unemployment volatility by setting ξ
arbitrarily large; i.e. it re-discovers the free entry assumption.
15
work, where unemployment volatility is driven by job separation shocks, be
consistent with the Beveridge curve and the Shimer (2012) decomposition?
Consider Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 describes the impulse response of
unemployment to a single separation innovation at date zero (holding pro-
ductivity fixed pt = 1). It also plots the exogeneous AR1 job separation
process δt.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response of Unemployment to a Separation Shock
The impulse response function labeled [H/M with JD] describes the im-
pulse response of unemployment for the case of free entry and small surplus.
That shock yields a relatively small increase in unemployment and unem-
ployment exhibits the same persistence as that of the underlying separation
process. ξ = 0.265 instead generates a much higher unemployment peak
and much greater persistence. Figure 3, which describes the corresponding
impulse response of vacancies, reveals why.
Free entry with small surplus [H/M with JD] implies vacancies increase
given a rise in unemployment. This vacancy response ensures unemployment
quickly recovers to its long run steady state. This adjustment process also
implies unemployment and vacancies covary positively which is inconsistent
with the Beveridge curve.
In contrast with ξ = 0.265, Figure 3 demonstrates the vacancy stock falls
as unemployment increases.11 The job separation shock not only destroys
some vacancies, it generates a rising tide of unemployed workers, some of
11The initial iterations in Figure 3 are affected by the assumed timing of the model.
For the free entry case, a higher job separation rate δt (which is known at stage I but
separations do not occur till stage V) reduces stage III market tightness. Because stage
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Figure 3: Impulse Response of Vacancies to a Separation Shock
whom quickly re-match with the existing vacancy stock. With an inelastic
vacancy creation process, oversampling of the vacancy stock by newly laid-
off workers causes the vacancy stock to fall. Unemployed worker job finding
rates then plummet as the increasing number of unemployed workers pursue
ever scarcer vacancies. These dynamics thus generate results consistent with
Shimer (2012), the reason being that a [recession-leading but short-lived] job
separation shock causes [persistently] high unemployment and [persistently]
low job finding rates. And by not imposing zero job separation shocks, the
calibrated model is then free to find it is the job separation process which
drives unemployment volatility.
5 The 2008/9 Great Recession.
The power of the approach is readily demonstrated by considering the aggre-
gate labor market dynamics of the U.S. economy following the 2008/9 Great
Recession. Using CPS data, Figure 4 describes [seasonally adjusted] gross
III unemployment is on trend for the first iteration, lower market tightness then implies
vacancies fall below trend for the first iteration (but subsequently increase as unemploy-
ment increases). Conversely for the case ξ = 0.265, new vacancy creation it is always
above trend (which ensures the unemployment stock eventually returns to trend). For
the first two iterations the stock of vacancies (measured at stage III prior to job destruc-
tion) is slightly above trend. But steeply increasing unemployment and oversampling then
cause the vacancy stock to plummet, where the vacancy stock begins to recover only when
unemployment falls below its peak.
17
hires and gross job separations.12 It also plots [non-farm] layoffs taken from
JOLTS (a time series which has been available since 2001).
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Figure 4: U.S. Job Turnover [2000-2015].13
Figure 4 reveals the unprecedentedly large spike in layoffs across the 2008-
2009 Great Recession. Ceteris paribus, the free entry approach predicts va-
cancies increase and hires surge following such a shock. This did not happen.
Instead and consistent with our approach, this demonstrably large job sepa-
ration shock generated Beveridge curve dynamics: the stock of vacancies fell
steeply as unemployment increased.
Figure 5 describes in greater detail the evolution of the U.S. labor market
across and subsequent to the 2008/9 layoff spike. Using the Shimer (2005)
methodology, it describes unemployment, market tightness, productivity and
layoffs, each measured as log deviations from trend using an HP filter with
smoothing parameter 105.
12Series are constructed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and are
available at https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_flows.htm
13Hires measure is the flow of workers from unemployment and non-labor force to em-
ployment, Job Separations is the flow of workers from employment to unemployment and
non-labor force (all in thousands)
13Series are quarterly deviations from HP trends (λ = 105). Productivity is BLS output
per worker from Major Sector Productivity and Costs, unemployment is BLS constructs
from CPS, vacancies used in market tightness is job openings from JOLTS, and layoffs are
also from JOLTS (non-farm business).
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Figure 5: U.S. Labor Market Indicators [2008-2015].14
At the start of the layoff spike, market tightness was slightly above trend
and unemployment slightly below. The surge in layoffs coincided with steeply
increasing unemployment, a steep fall in vacancies [not graphed] and an even
steeper fall in market tightness [graphed]. Yet over this time period, 2008-
15, productivity was positively correlated with unemployment. Free entry
and small surplus thus predict market tightness should have been positively
correlated with unemployment. Consistent with Table 4, however, Figure
5 reveals that market tightness was instead strongly negatively correlated
with unemployment. Furthermore with high unemployment and above trend
productivity from 2010 onwards, free entry predicts the vacancy stock and
gross hires should both have been well above trend. Figure 4 demonstrates
hire flows merely reverted to trend. It is thus difficult to rationalise the
post-2008 evolution of the U.S. economy using the free entry approach. In
contrast with ξ = 0.265, the impulse response functions (Figures 2 and 3)
yield qualitatitively identical behavior following a job separation shock.
We identify the extent to which our framework is consistent with the
data for the period 2001-2015 using the JOLTS layoff series as a more di-
rect measure of the job separation process.15 Although the 2008/9 layoff
spike is not consistent with a stationary AR1 process, we repeat the above
15though it should be noted that temporary layoffs are widespread in the U.S.; e.g.
Feldstein (1976) and Fujita and Moscarini (2015) .
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methodology. For the period 2001-2015, (pt, δt) are assumed to follow a joint
AR1 process and we reset the autocorrelation parameters ρp, ρδ and covari-
ance matrix Σ to match the data. Doing this implies ρp = 0.95, ρδ = 0.89
with σp = 0.0063, σδ = 0.036 and cross-correlation ρpδ = −0.38 at monthly
frequencies. Column 1 [data] in Table 6 reports the updated targets.
Table 6: Simulation Results for JOLTS calibration
Data ξ = 0 ξ = 0.265
Standard Deviations
σu 0.203 0.128 0.113
σv 0.184 0.177 0.135
σθ 0.379 0.303 0.246
Cross Correlations
corr(v,u) [BC] -0.93 -0.98 -0.97
corr(θ, u) -0.98 -0.99 -0.99
corr(θ, v) 0.98 0.99 0.99
Notes: In Data column, u is the unemployment constructed by BLS
from CPS, v, is the job openings from JOLTS, and θ = v/u. The data
is quarterly average over the period 2001-2015. All the statistics are
calculated for HP filtered (with λ = 105) series. σx is the standard
deviation of x and corr(x, y) the cross correlation between x and y.
Column 3 records the corresponding statistics using model generated data
with ξ = 0.265 as previously estimated. Not surprisingly given the close
match of the impulse response functions [Figures 2 and 3] to the data [Fig-
ure 5], this specification continues to provide an excellent fit of the joint
correlations of unemployment, vacancies and market tightness. But this
time ξ = 0.265 yields too little unemployment volatility. Because a more
inelastic vacancy creation process deflates job finding rates following a large
layoff shock, SMM this time estimates the polar case ξ = 0; i.e. perfectly
inelastic vacancy creation rates. This in part reflects Figure 4 which shows
that hires reverted to trend following the layoff spike - the so-called jobless
recovery. Nevertheless even with ξ = 0, this methodology yields too little
unemployment volatility over this period.
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6 Conclusion.
This paper has revealed the empirical difficulties caused by assuming the
free entry of vacancies in the DMP framework. Specifically a key implica-
tion of the free entry approach - that conditional on productivity variables,
market tightness is orthogonal to unemployment - is not consistent with the
data (e.g. Table 4 and Figure 5 for the Great Recession). By relaxing the
free entry assumption in the DMP framework, estimation using SMM finds
the vacancy creation process is instead inelastic. The resulting equilibrium
framework is consistent both with the insights of Shimer (2005), (2012) and
with the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) view on job creation and job de-
struction (here job separation) patterns over the cycle. Results find an ad
hoc restriction to zero job separation shocks is not appropriate. Indeed when
suitably relaxed, this DMP framework finds it is the job separation pro-
cess which drives unemployment volatility over the cycle. The approach is
particularly powerful for it provides a simple and coherent explanation for
the observed unemployment and vacancy dynamics in the U.S. following the
Great Recession.
Our approach suggests very different lines for future research. For exam-
ple, what are the underlying economic factors which drive the job separation
process? Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) identify a mechanism whereby
adverse aggregate productivity shocks cause pulses of job destruction. The
Great Recession, however, suggests financial [or credit] shocks might also
play an important role; e.g. Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Chodorow-Reich
(2014), Boeri et al (2015). For example Bentolila et al (2015) show (for
Spain) that firms with credit relationships tied to banks facing severe liq-
uidity problems were much more likely to downsize or go out of business.
Because the vacancy creation elasticity ξ plays a central role in determining
the propagation properties of the economy, more direct evidence on its value
is clearly desirable. Of course a major advantage of dropping the small sur-
plus assumption is that the equilibrium DMP framework once more becomes
relevant for policy analysis; e.g. Costain and Reiter (2008).
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A Job Separation Measures
Given data on employment et (the number employed in month t), short
term unemployment u0t (the number of workers unemployed with duration
less than one month) and an estimate of worker job finding rate ft, Shimer
(2005) infers the job separation rate st using
u0t+1 = stet(1−
1
2
ft).
With the identifying assumption that ft, st are constant within the month as
first considered in Gregg and Petrongolo (2005), Shimer (2012) instead notes
the condition
ut+1 =
(1− e−ft−st)st
ft + st
(ut + et) + e
−ft−stut
can be used to infer st. Elsby et la (2009), Fujita and Ramey (2009) consider
alternative approaches to measure st.
B Complete Results
We report table 1 in Shimer (2005) and, for comparison, the equivalent table
for our SMM results with ξ = 0.265.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. data, 1951003, table from Shimer
(2005) page 28.
u v v/u f s p
Standard Deviations 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.075 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.733 0.878
u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 0.709 -0.408
v 1 0.975 0.897 -0.684 0.364
Correlation matrix v/u 1 0.948 -0.715 0.396
f 1 -0.574 0.396
s 1 -0.524
p 1
Table 8: SMM results with ξ = 0.265
u v v/u f s p
Standard Deviations 0.18 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.075 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.73 0.87
u 1 -0.96 -0.99 -0.99 0.54 -0.63
v 1 0.99 0.99 -0.30 0.58
Correlation matrix v/u 1 0.99 -0.42 0.61
f 1 -0.42 0.60
s 1 -0.52
p 1
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